


# Models for Concepts and Their Operations

Noah Chrein

September 18, 2019

# Ontology of Contents



[<https://github.com/nopouch/golog>]

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or:  $\text{man} + \text{umbrella} = \text{man, umbrella, 5 light years away}$
- Although eventually this failed (for exactly this reason) we have still tried to organize concepts algebraicly




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- This network's task was to find an "Word Embedding"  
 $W: \text{Words} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  [Mikolov][2]
- The result is a word embedding that places contextually relevant words close to each other.



graphics from C. Olah[3]

# Magical Analogies


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- A side effect of this word embedding, is that vector operations seemed to represent analogies
- if you run vector operations, and you would get something like:

$$W(\text{"Woman"}) - W(\text{"Man"}) \simeq W(\text{"Queen"}) - W(\text{"King"})$$

" Man is to Woman as King is to Queen"



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- Sentences like "The wall is red" and "the wall is blue" allow us to "swap" the words blue and red
- this is the meaning behind a vector operation like  $W(\text{"blue"}) - W(\text{"red"})$

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
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- We already have a model of how concepts relate to other concepts contextually
- What we lack is a model for a concept, *internally*
- To differentiate between "Man holding a teacup" and "Man swimming in a teacup", we should consult the internals of the sum  $\text{Man} + \text{Teacup}$

# Concepts are Objects

I think we already have it  
I am talking about category theory


# Concepts are Sets?

- the goal is to create unambiguous conceptual addition by consulting the internals of a concept
- Our universe for concepts was a vector space, but let's now consider this as a (directed) graph



- from this perspective, we can see the nodes clearly
- let's give some data to these nodes
- assume each node is instead a set

# Man, Woman, King, Queen as Sets



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$$O(\text{King}) - O(\text{Man}) + O(\text{Woman}) =$$

$$\{\text{'dress'}, \text{'power'}, \text{'pretty'}, \text{'royalty'}\} = O(\text{Queen})$$

# Sets aren't the "best" model

- We can describe a "universe with a man and a teacup" using disjoint union:

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- the conceptual sets of "man" and "teacup" do not share any underlying concepts (like king and queen did) so their union will always be disjoint

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- but even these lack power: no composition
- we can go on and on choosing better and better models: Simplicial Sets, Higher Simplicial Sets, Topological Spaces, Vector Spaces, Hilbert Spaces ...
- before **choosing** a "best" model to describe the internals let's agree on how to work with any model

# Lifting to arbitrary objects


- Let's just assume that whatever models we have, they live inside of some category  $\mathcal{C}$
- We can recast our union and excision in categorical semantics alone
- This concept is known as a Universal Property

# Some necessary assumptions


- 1) Our concept's internals are objects of some category
- 2) There is some Universe object (to compare concepts)
- 3) (For the categorically minded)  $\mathcal{C}$  must also be co/complete with a terminal and initial object



# Universe Example




# Intersection is Pullback




begin with our embeddings  
into our universe set

# Intersection is Pullback




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
begin with our embeddings  
into our universe set  
The intersection is something  
that embeds into both concepts  
And it is the biggest thing  
that embeds into both concepts

# Union is Pushout




Now that we have our intersection

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
Now that we have our intersection  
Both concepts embed into the union  
Such that it's intersection goes  
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# Union is Pushout



Now that we have our intersection  
Both concepts embed into the union  
Such that it's intersection goes  
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The Union is the smallest  
thing that does this


# Compliment and set subtraction



Assume that some concept and another have empty intersection




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


The "Compliment" of that concept is the largest thing with empty intersection


# Compliment and set subtraction



We can then combine  
the intersection and  
the compliment to  
for the subtraction  
 $King - Man = King \cap Man^c$




Without the "Universe" Object to compare the internals of two concepts, we can still "force" two objects together by asserting their intersection



Using a universality condition, we can find a "best" concept to complete the diagram

# Gluing



The Classic example is gluing two disks together by their boundary circle to get a sphere

# Summary so far

- We Came up with a case for describing the internals of a concept

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
# Summary so far

- We Came up with a case for describing the internals of a concept
- We tried this with sets, discussed some algebra of sets
- We found some downside with the expressability of sets
- We generalized our operations from sets to arbitrary "nice" categories

Now let's talk about some specific categories


# Concepts as Graphs

- so now the question is, can we use our conceptual algebra to differentiate the possible man + teacup compositions
  - Lets lift our internal conceptual representations from Set to Graph
- So for example, man and teacup:



# Graph Disjoint Union

As it is, we can still define the disjoint union of these two graphs. This will give us a "Universe With an Man and a Teacup":



# Relations as Graphs

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
$$H = \{ \text{supporter} \xrightarrow{\text{holds}} \text{supported} \}$$

$$S = \{ \text{Under} \xrightarrow{\text{swims}} \text{Liquid} \}$$

And the one point graph with no edge \*

$$* = \{ \bullet \}$$


# Man holding teacup



Consider the diagram  $H$   
a subcategory of graph  
The shown functions send  
the single point  $\bullet$   
to the name of the function.  
e.g.  $\text{hand}(\bullet) = \text{hand}$




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
By gluing  $H$  (Universality)  
We can construct a conceptual  
addition  $Man +_S Teacup$

# Man Holding Teacup




# conceptual addition of man swimming in teacup

Of course, now we can do this for "swimming" as well




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


# Conceptual addition of Man wading in Teacup

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


# Man Wading in Teacup



# Graphs: Externally and Internally

- but remember that our original "concept space" is also a graph
- on the outside I might have a relation like:  
man  $\xrightarrow{\text{wading in}}$  teacup
- on the inside it looks something like this:



# Graphs: Externally and Internally

- on the inside I have the categorical semantics to define

"man +<sub>S</sub> teacup"

but on the outside I do not...

- If, on the outside, I had some categorical structure I might be able to compare universal properties



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- realizing the inside of concepts in some category, we can construct universal properties
- if the outside "collection of concepts" formed a category as well, we could derive universal properties before expanding
- upon expansion we will better realize what was meant, but before then, we should still be able to guess

# Categories all the way down

- If both the inside and outside are objects in the same category, then we can do multiple "expansions"

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- That is, both the external collection of concepts, and internals of particular concept, should be categories
- this way, the inside universal property and the outside Universal property "guess" can agree up to some functoriality condition
- further, the elements on the inside of a concept can be expanded to provide more details

# Categories all the way down

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- this way, the inside universal property and the outside Universal property "guess" can agree up to some functoriality condition
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(For another talk)

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